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Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements and Title VII:
Promoting Efficiency While
Protecting Employee Rights
EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps1
I. INTRODUCTION
While the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that claims based
on statutory rights may be vindicated by arbitration, the Court has yet to determine
the validity of a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreement ("MAA") that cov-
ers Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contrary to every other district court of
appeals to have considered the matter, has held that Title VII claims may not be
subjected to arbitration under an MAA. The instant case once again addresses the
question of whether the Ninth Circuit will allow an employer to require its em-
ployees to sign an MAA covering Title VII claims as a condition of employment.
1H. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1997, Donald Scott Lagatree ("Lagatree") received a conditional offer of
employment from Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP ("Luce Forward").2
Luce Forward admittedly declined to hire Lagatree solely because Lagatree re-
fused to sign an MAA requiring Lagatree to submit all "claims arising from or
related to his employment" to binding arbitration. Lagatree filed a wrongful
termination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), which subsequently sued Luce Forward on behalf of Lagatree and the
public interest.4 The EEOC sought make-whole relief for Lagatree, as well as a
permanent injunction forbidding Luce Forward from enforcing existing MAAs
and from retaliating against individuals who refuse to sign the MAA.
The EEOC argued that applicants could not be forced to waive the right to a
judicial forum as a condition of employment.6 The EEOC further claimed that
1. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002)
2. Id.
3. Id. at 997.
4. Id. at 998.
5. Id. Make-whole relief includes "rightful place employment," back wages and benefits, and
compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
6. Id. at 998. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2002) (Title VII) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2002)
(ADA) (prohibiting discrimination based on disabilities); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2002) (ADEA) (pro-
hibiting discrimination based on age); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2002) (Fair Labor Standards Act) (pro-
hibiting discrimination against an employee for filing a complaint).
1
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Luce Forward unlawfully retaliated against Lagatree in two ways.7 First, the
EEOC claimed Lagatree's refusal to waive his right to a judicial forum was pro-
tected opposition conduct under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 8
Second, the EEOC argued that denying employment to those who refuse to sign
the MAA constituted a "preemptive strike against future participation conduct
afforded absolute protection under each of the federal anti-retaliation provisions."
9
The United States District Court for the Central District of California refused
the EEOC's request for make-whole relief and an injunction under the federal
anti-discrimination acts.' 0 However, considering itself bound by its decision in
Duffield prohibiting Title VII MAAs," the District Court issued "an injunction
prohibiting Luce Forward from requiring its employees to agree to arbitrate their
Title VII claims as a condition of employment and from attempting to enforce any
such previously executed agreements."' 12 The District Court did not expressly rule
on the EEOC's retaliation theory.'
3
The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's Duffield-based permanent in-
junction against enforcement of the MAAs. 14 The Court of Appeals overturned
Duffield as being irreconcilable with the language and reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Circuit City, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit and other
circuits, and Title VII. 5 The Court of Appeals held that "an employer may re-
quire employees to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of employment," so
long as the MAAs "comply with the principles of traditional contract law, includ-
ing the doctrine of unconscionability."16
III. LEGAL HISTORY
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") was enacted to eliminate judicial hostil-
ity towards arbitration agreements, and to place arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other contracts.17  Section 2 of the FAA states that "[a] written [arbi-
7. Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
8. Id. at 1006 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2002) (making it "unlawful to coerce... or interfere
with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or protected by this chap-
ter.")).
9. Id. at 1007.
10. Id. at 997.
11. Duffleld v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
12. Luce, 303 F.3d at 998.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1008.
15. Id. at 1003-04. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (implicitly rejecting
Duffield); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding Con-
gress did not intend to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d
1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding Title VII claims subject to arbitration where the parties have
knowingly and voluntarily so agreed); Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 118 (2002) (reprinted in
notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2002) (stating arbitration is recommended)).
16. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1004.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
2
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tration] provision in any... contract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. ' 18 The FAA exempts "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce., 19 Under the FAA, a federal district court is empowered to issue stays of
proceedings subject to arbitration, as well as orders compelling arbitration when
one party has violated an MAA.20 These provisions manifest a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements. 21
Title VII was passed to prevent employment discrimination due to "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."22 Title VII prohibits intentional discrimi-
nation toward individuals, as well as disparate treatment of protected classes.23
Because Title VII protects employees as individuals and in the aggregate, Title
VII rights are "relational and systematic," and therefore "necessarily inalien-
able. ,
24
A. Gilmer: Approving Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
In 1991, the Supreme Court held that a discrimination claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is subject to compulsory arbitra-
25tion under an MAA. In Gilmer, the employee executed a securities registration
application which contained an agreement to arbitrate "[alny controversy between
a registered representative [i.e. employee] and any member or member organiza-
tion [i.e. employer] arising out of the employment or termination of employment
of such registered representative. 26 The employee, then 65 years old, brought an
ADEA claim in district court after the employer discharged him.27 The employer
28subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration.
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the right to a judicial forum is not a
substantive right, a waiver thereof in favor of arbitration does not hinder an em-
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
18. Id. [hereinafter "FAA Exemption Clause"].
19. Id. at § 1 (2000) [hereinafter "FAA Coverage Clause"].
20. Id. at §§ 3,4.
21. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991); Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
22. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(l) [hereinafter "Title VII"].
23. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1001 (1998) ("We have held
that [employment practice] ... 'evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and women in employment."' (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
24. Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 253 (1998) ("Title VII was enacted to benefit all
of society by eliminating systemic labor market inequality, which limits alienability of its protections
because "rights that are relational and systemic are necessarily inalienable; individuals cannot waive
them because individuals are not their sole focus." (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding
Conundrum: Inalienable rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 1849, 1863 (1987)).
25. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 24.
20031
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ployee's ability to vindicate her statutory rights. 29 The Supreme Court found that
statutory claims were subject to arbitration absent evidence that Congress "in-
ten[ded] to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at is-
sue." 30 Such congressional intent could be found "in the text of the [statute], its
legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the [statute's]
underlying purposes." 3' The Supreme Court concluded that because the employee
had failed to establish that Congress intended to exempt ADEA claims from arbi-
tration, such claims were arbitrable.
32
B. Civil Rights Act of 1991 - Qualified Approval of Arbitration
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA 1991") expanded the judicial remedies
available to victims of discrimination. Section 118 of CRA 1991 grants qualified
approval to arbitration of Title VII claims "where appropriate." 33 The legislative
history of CRA 1991 indicates that Section 118's provision for "the use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution mechanisms [was] intended to supplement, not supplant,
the remedies provided by Title VII." 34 Congress did "not intend for the inclusion
of [Section 118 to] be used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise
be available." 35  Furthermore, Section 118 "contemplates the use of voluntary
arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they have arisen, not coercive at-
tempts to force employees in advance to forego statutory rights. 36 In passing
Section 118, "no approval whatsoever [was] intended of the Supreme Court's...
decision in Gilmer [approving mandatory arbitration of ADEA discrimination
claim], or any application or extension of it to Title VII.",
37
C. Judicial Approaches to Prospective Arbitration Agreements
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, four approaches devel-
oped in the circuits for the treatment of MAAs purporting to cover Title VII
claims (hereafter referred to as a Title VII MAA). The first approach was only
taken by the Ninth Circuit in Duffield, which held Title VII MAAs invalid.38 The
majority of circuits follow the second approach, which allows arbitration under
Title VII MAAs if doing so effectively vindicates their statutory claims.39 In the
29. Id. at 26; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (stating that a party who agrees to arbitrate its statutory claims "trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration,"
but the "party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute").
30. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 20.
33. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 § 118 (reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981). "Where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including ... arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter." Id.
34, H.R. Rpt. 102-40, at 41 (May 17, 1991) (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. 137 Cong. Rec. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. See Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182.
39. See e.g. Cole v. Burns Intl. Sec. Svcs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (allowing compulsory
arbitration for Title VII claims where the arbitration clause provides procedural fairness, does not
4
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third approach, a minority of circuits have held that Gilmer creates a nonrebut-
table presumption that Title VII MAAs are valid. 40 Finally, the fourth approach
holds that Gilmer creates a rebuttable presumption that Title VII MAAs are
valid.4a
In 1992, prior to Duffield, the Ninth Circuit followed the fourth approach. a2
In Mago, the Court of Appeals held Title VII created a rebuttable presumption
that MAAs are valid 4 3 This presumption was held rebuttable by evidence of con-
gressional intent indicating otherwise, as found in "the text of Title VII, its legis-
lative history, or [in] an 'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the underlying
purposes of Title VII." 44 Because the ADEA and Title VII are "similar in their
aims and substantive provisions," the Court of Appeals extended Gilmer's ap-
proval of MAAs for ADEA claims to Title VII claims.45 The Ninth Circuit, with-
out considering Section 118, found the employee failed to meet her burden of
producing evidence that Congress intended to prohibit Title VII MAAs. a6
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit again presumed Title VII claims were subject to
arbitration absent evidence of congressional intent to the contrary. 7 In Lai, the
court, citing Mago and Gilmer, found that compulsory arbitration was only appro-
priate where the employee alleging discrimination under Title VII "has knowingly
agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration. '"48 The Ninth Circuit noted Section
118 and its legislative history, which set forth the "concern that Title VII disputes
be arbitrated only "where appropriate," and only when such a procedure was
knowingly accepted.4 9 Because the MAA did not reference any type of dispute
subject to arbitration (including employment disputes), the court held the employ-
ees did not knowingly agree to forego their statutory rights and remedies in favor
of arbitration. 50
In 1998, contrary to its decisions in Mago and Lai, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Duffield held that CRA 1991 prohibited employers from forcing em-
ployees to waive their right to a judicial forum for claims arising under Title VII
(or parallel state statutes) as a condition of employment.5' While acknowledging
impose financial burdens on plaintiff's access to the arbitral forum, and allows for those remedies that
are central to the statutory scheme). "Gilmer cannot be read as holding that an arbitration agreement is
enforceable no matter what rights it waives or what burdens it imposes." Id. at 1482.
40. See Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948
F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
41. See e.g. Mago, 956 F.2d 932.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 935 (emphasis added).
44. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
45. Id.; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); see also Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,
836 F.2d 1544, 1554 (10th Cir. 1988) (Title VII arbitration decisions should apply to ADEA cases
because both statutes are similar).
46. Mago, 956 F.2d at 935 (quoting ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
227 (1987)).
47. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299.
48. Id. at 1305.
49. Id. (quoting § 118). See 137 Cong. Rec. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991, statement of
Sen. Dole) (declaring that § 118 encourages arbitration only "where the parties knowingly and volun-
tarily elect to use these methods").
50. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
51. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199.
2003]
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Congress's intent to encourage voluntary arbitration agreements, the court found
that reading Section 118 to permit Title VII MAAs was "at odds with Congress's
directive to read Title VII broadly so as to best effectuate its remedial purposes.
5 2
According to the court, Section 118's inclusion of the phrases "where appro-
priate" and "to the extent authorized by law" provided separate and distinct limita-
tions on Title VII arbitration.53 "Where appropriate" evidenced Congress's inten-
tion to allow arbitration where it provides "victims of discrimination an opportu-
nity to present their claims in an alternative forum ... that they find desirable -
not by forcing an unwanted forum upon them., 54 "To the extent authorized by
law" codified the law prior to Gilmer, which held that an MAA in a collective
bargaining agreement did not bar an employee from pursuing Title VII remedies
in federal court.55 Among other pieces of legislative history, the court pointed to
the report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, which stated that "the
committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration,
whether in the context of collective bargaining or in an employment contract, does
not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provi-
sions of Title VII.' 56 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Congress
specifically rejected a proposal that would have allowed MAAs to be enforced.57
Finding the context, language, and legislative history of CRA 1991 clearly indi-
cated Congress's intention to deny enforcement of MAAs covering Title VII
claims, the court held it "inescapable" that Title VII claims were not subject to
compulsory arbitration under an MAA.55
D. Circuit City: The Supreme Court Implicitly Overturns Duffield
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
the FAA applied to all employment contracts. 59 In Circuit City, the plaintiff
signed an employment application which included an MAA covering all claims
arising out of his employment. 6° The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit's conclu-
sion that all employment contracts were excluded from the FAA was contrary to
every other district court of appeals that had addressed the question. 61 If all con-
tracts of employment were beyond the scope of the FAA, the separate exemption
for specific classes of workers in the FAA exemption clause would be pointless.
62
52. Id. at 1192-93.
53. Id. at 1193.
54. Id. at 1194.
55. Id. at 1194-95. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
56. Id. at 1195 (quoting H.R. Rep. 102-40(1) at 97).
57. Id. at 1198 (citing H.R. Rep. 102-40(l), at 104).
58. Id. at 1197; 137 Cong. Rec. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("[Sec-
tion 1181 contemplates the use of voluntary arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they have
arisen, not coercive attempts to force employees in advance to forego statutory rights. No approval
whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gilmer ... or any application or
extension of it to Title VII.")
59. Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105.
60. Id. at 109-10.
61. Id. at 110-11.
62. Id. at 113-14 ("Construing the residual phrase ['any other class of workers engaged in ... com-
merce'] to exclude all employment contracts fails to give independent effect to the statute's enumera-
tion of the specific categories of workers which precedes it; there would be no need for Congress to
6
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The Supreme Court stated that because Gilmer held that the right to a judicial
forum was not a substantive right, MAAs could be enforced under the FAA with-
out contravening the policies of statutory protections against discrimination.63
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Luce
overturned Duffield, holding Circuit City approved the use of Title VII MAAs. 64
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Circuit City undermined Duffield to such a degree as to render
it invalid.65 The court noted Gilmer held arbitration did not hinder the employee's
ability to effectively vindicate her rights. 66 The court then criticized the Duffield
court for selectively choosing portions of legislative history that supported the
proposition that Title VII MAAs were prohibited.67 While Duffield cited Mago
and Lai, it did not address the earlier panel's express statements that Gilmer (in
Mago and Lai) and Section 118 (in Lai) authorized compulsory arbitration of Title
VII claims.68 Finally, the court noted that other circuits and the Supreme Courts
of California and Nevada had repudiated Duffield.69
The court enumerated four reasons for allowing an employer to require its
employees to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of employment. First, it was
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City.7 ° Second, doing so
unified the Ninth Circuit's case law, and brought it in line with other circuits.7'
Third, the court pointed to Section 118's encouragement of arbitration as a means
use the phrases 'seamen' and 'railroad employees' if those same classes of workers were subsumed
within the meaning of the 'engaged in... commerce' residual clause.).
See 9 U.S.C. § I (FAA Exemption Clause).
63. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123 (emphasis added); see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 ("[B]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.").
64. Luce, 303 F.3d at 994.
65. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1002 (citing Circuit City). See United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("As a general rule, one three-judge panel of this court cannot reconsider or overrule the
decision of a prior panel. An exception into this rule arises when an intervening Supreme Court deci-
sion undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit .... ")
66. Id. at 999 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral
forum, rather than a judicial forum." (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
67. Id. at 1001.
68. Id. at 1002.
69. Id. at 1002; See e.g. Desiderio v. Natil. Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir.
1999); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999); Kove-
leskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We respectfully disagree with
the Ninth Circuit on this issue..."); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998);
Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Intl. Sec. Servs.,
105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d
875, 882 (4th Cir. 1996); Metz, 39 F.3d at 1487; Bender, 971 F.2d at 700; Alford, 939 F.2d at 230;
Willis, 948 F.2d at 307; see also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 754
(2000) (stating "[a]side from the fact Duffield is a minority of one, we find its reasoning unpersua-
sive."); Kindred v. Second Jud. Dist., 996 P.2d 903, 906 (2000).
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to resolve Title VII claims. 72 Fourth, the court noted that employees have protec-
tion against unfair arbitration clauses under the principles of traditional contract
law.
7 3
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") argued its abil-
ity to carry out its mission would be hindered if Title VII MAAs were allowed.74
An employee is free to file a claim with the EEOC even under a Title VII MAA.75
Because the EEOC is able to bring a judicial action on behalf of the employee in
order to seek specific relief, the court found that allowing Title VII MAAs did not
impede the EEOC's ability to carry out its mission.76
The court next addressed EEOC's claim of unlawful retaliation against Laga-
tree.77 The federal discrimination laws make it unlawful for an employer to retali-
ate against an applicant or employee because she has engaged in a protected activ-
ity, which includes both opposing an unlawful employment practice, and partici-
pating in a statutorily authorized proceeding. 78 It was undisputed that Lagatree
suffered an adverse employment decision when Luce Forward refused to hire him
because of his refusal to sign the arbitration agreement. 79 The court stated that
Lagatree's refusal would have been protected if it was based on a reasonable be-
lief that the Title VII MAA was unlawful. 80 Because all relevant legal authority
up to the time of Lagatree's refusal to sign the MAA permitted compulsory arbi-
tration of Title VII claims, the court found that Lagatree's refusal could not be
considered reasonable. 81 The court accordingly held that Luce Forward did not
82
unlawfully retaliate against Lagatree.
The EEOC next argued that Luce Forward preemptively denied employment
to Lagatree in response to his refusal to waive his right to bring a civil action in a
judicial forum. 83 Citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gilmer and Circuit
City, the court defeated EEOC's argument by stating that the right to a judicial
forum was not a substantive right.8 Lagatree's refusal to agree to Luce Forward's
terms of employment was instead found to be a "rational economic decision [by
Lagatree] that Luce Forward was asking too much and offering too little in re-
72. Id. (quoting Congress's declaration in § 118 that "arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes






78. Id. at 1004-05; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (Title VI) (prohibiting discrimination for an
employee's refusal to follow an unlawful employment practice or for assisting in, participating in, or
bringing a challenge against such an unlawful employment practice); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA)
(prohibiting discrimination for participating in an investigation, complaint, or proceeding under the
ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (Fair Labor Standards Act) (prohibiting discrimination against an em-
ployee for filing a complaint).
79, Luce, 303 F.3d at 1005.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1006 ("Lagatree could not have reasonably interpreted the ADA's pronouncement that
arbitration is encouraged' to mean that 'compulsory arbitration as a condition of employment is for-
bidden."').
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1006-07.
84. Id. at 1007.
8
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turn."8 5 The court concluded that there was no unlawful retaliation because no
federal statute afforded absolute protection to Lagatree's right to a judicial fo-
rum.
86
The court in the instant case ultimately held that employers could require and
enforce mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims as a condition of employment,
so long as the Title VII MAA complied with traditional principles of contract
law. 87 The court accordingly vacated the district court's "Duffield-based" perma-
nent injunction, and expressly overturned Duffield.5
A. The Dissent
Judge Pregerson strongly dissented in the instant case, arguing Duffield
should remain good law.89 Judge Pregerson first argued that it was entirely com-
patible to hold in Circuit City that non-transportation workers who consent to
arbitration agreements were subject to the FAA, and to hold in Duffield that em-
ployers cannot require arbitration of Title VII claims as a condition of employ-
ment.90 Judge Pregerson further argued that even though mandatory arbitration
agreements can effectuate the purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statutes,
a court could still find that MAAs do not promote the policies of Title VII. 9'
Judge Pregerson noted Duffield's discussion of the phrase "where appropriate" in
Section 118 indicated Congress only sought to permit arbitration of Title VII
claims where the arbitration agreement was signed voluntarily.92 Judge Pregerson
further argued that Duffield relied on Title VII's text, legislative history, and con-
text, rather than on the right to a judicial forum being a substantive right as as-
serted by the majority.93
Judge Pregerson noted Duffield specifically found the language from Gilmer
quoted in Circuit City did not contradict the Duffield decision.94 Circuit City did
not implicitly overrule Duffield by quoting language which the majority in Duf-
field found compatible with its holding.95 Judge Pregerson maintained that the
majority's criticism of Duffield was merely a disagreement with the court's own
earlier decision, and was thus insufficient to allow the court to reconsider the is-
sue.9 6 Finally, Judge Pregerson argued the benefits of arbitration did not outweigh
the loss of the fight to a judicial forum. 97
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1004.
88. Id. at 1004, 1008.
89. Id. at 1008.
90. Id. at 1009; see Circuit City, 535 U.S. at 1311; Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1202-03.
91. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1010; see Circuit City, 535 U.S. at 1313.
92. Luce, 303 F.3d at 10ll; see Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194.
93. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1012 ("Indeed, our statement in Duffield that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
'increased substantially the procedural rights and remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs' . . . sug-
gests ... that [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] perceived the right to a jury trial as a procedural
right."); see Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189.
94. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1013; see Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 1313.
95. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1013.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1014.
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V. COMMENT
A. Relation of Luce to Precedent
Prior to Gilmer, there was notable confusion in the circuits as to whether
Congress intended to authorize arbitration of statutory claims. 98 Gilmer led every
circuit but the Ninth to approve the arbitration of Title VII claims. 99 Prior to Luce,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had stated that Circuit City weakened the
strength of its decision in Duffield.'00 By overturning Duffield, Luce solidified the
Ninth Circuit's approval of Title VII MAAs.' 0 '
The decision in the instant case respects the proclamation of Circuit City that
"arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the
policies of congressional enactments," including Title VII, by "giving employees
specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law." 10 2 Duffield
had been rejected by the Supreme Court of California.10 3 Luce brings the Ninth
Circuit in line with every other Circuit which has addressed the issue of whether
employees may be forced to agree to arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of
employment.1
98. See Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for
Amendment, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 521, 545-46 (1994).
99. See Willis, 948 F.2d at 307 (compelling arbitration of Title VII claims subsequent to MAA);
Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 365; Metz, 39 F.3d at 1487-88 (holding Title VH claims subject to MAAs,
extending Gilmer to Title VII based on its similarity with the ADEA); Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205.
100. See Circuit City Stores v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1106-1107 (9th Cir. 2002) (questioning.the
validity of Duffield in light of Circuit City). But see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Banyasz, 2001 WL
1218406 at *3 (N.D. Cal Oct. 11, 2001) (approving Duffield); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2001 WL
1105046 at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 9, 2001) ("Since the Duffield limitation applied to a FEHA claim, and
Circuit City ordered arbitration of a FEHA claim in a similar agreement without acknowledging the
Ninth Circuit prohibition against doing so, there may be some question whether the Ninth Circuit will
continue to adhere to Duffield."); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 2001 WL 867103 at
*2 (C.D. Cal April 23, 2001) (noting the other Circuit's questioning of Duffield's validity).
101. See Farac v. Permanente Medical Group, 186 F.Supp.2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding
"Circuit City implicitly overruled Duffield"); Eftekhari v. Peregrine Fin. & Sec., Inc., 2001 WL
1180640 at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2001) (stating "Circuit City reverses Duffield"); Olivares v. His-
panic Broad. Corp., 2001 WL 4771"71 at *1 (C.D. Cal. April 26, 2001) ("in light of... Circuit City...
Duffield should not preclude arbitration").
102. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123.
103. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 754.
104. See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 7 ("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
1991 [Civil Rights Act], does not, as a matter of law, prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements.");
Alford, 975 F.2d at 230 (United States Supreme Court reversed district court's decision not to compel
arbitration, remanded for reconsideration in light of Gilmer; on remand the 5th Cir. concluded that
Title VII claims are subject to compulsory arbitration); Desiderio, 191 F.3d at 205 (rejecting Duffield);
Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 365 (explicitly disagreeing with Duffield and holding Congress did not intend
Title VII to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Scott v. Burns Intl. Sec. Serv.
Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (D. Haw. 2001) (stating Circuit City implicitly overruled Duffield).
See also Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1315 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (stating that the viability
of Duffield has been called into question by Circuit City); Borg-Warner Protective Serv. Corp. v.
E.E.O.C., 245 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("We cannot say whether the Ninth Circuit will continue
to adhere to Duffield in the face of the Supreme Court's Circuit City decision.").
10
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B. Suitability of Title VII to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
1. Disadvantages to Employees
The court's decision in Luce raises concerns as to whether employees will
have adequate protection from discrimination after signing an MAA. Title VII
was passed in order to protect employees, both individually and as a whole, from
employment discrimination due to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
0 5
The primary purpose of Title VII is to avoid harm to employees by discrimination,
not to redress harm to individual employees. 10 6 However, the procedural frame-
work of arbitration presents a challenge to effectuating the purposes of Title VII.
Arbitration's costly forum fees can result in arbitration becoming much more
expensive, and hence prohibitive, for the employee than litigation. 0 7 Forum fees
in discrimination cases in the security industry are routinely over $20,000, with
several in excess of $40,000, $60,000, and $80,000.108 For example, a $60,000
employment discrimination claim in Cook County (I11.) Circuit Court would cost
$221 in court, whereas the forum fee for arbitration of the same claim would be
over $10,000.1°9 Individuals facing financial insecurity as a result of a termination
of employment face difficult decisions in determining whether to pursue their
discrimination claim." 
0
The potentially prohibitive costs of arbitration take on added significance be-
cause arbitration bars class actions. Company policies that cause company-wide
discrimination may result in relatively small harm to individual employees. The
potentially prohibitive costs of arbitration could make it impractical to pursue a
discrimination claim outside of a class action.*"' Accordingly, "the prohibition on
class actions thereby provides legal immunity for corporations who may have
105. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) [hereinafter "Title VII"].
106. Kolstad v. American Dental Assn., 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
107. Public Citizen, Cost of Arbitration: Executive Summary <http://www.lawmemo.com/
arb/res/cost.htm> (May 1, 2002):
The cost to a plaintiff of initiating an arbitration is almost always higher than the cost of institut-
ing a lawsuit. Our comparison of court fees to the fees charged by the three primary arbitration
provider organizations demonstrates that forum costs... can be up to five thousand percent
higher in arbitration than in court litigation. These costs have a deterrent effect, often preventing
a claimant from even filing a case.... [Flor example, the forum fee for a $60,000 employment
discrimination claim in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois is $221. The forum fees for the
same claim before the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) would be $10,925, 4,943% higher. An
$80,000 consumer claim brought in Cook County would cost $221, versus $11,625 at NAF...
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) would charge the plaintiff up to $6,650, and Judi-
cial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS) would charge up to $7,950, amounting to a
3,009% and 3,597% difference in cost, respectively.
108. Cliff Palefsky, Natl. Empl. Laws.' Assn., Testimony, Mandatory Arbitration in Securities Indus-
try (Sen. Banking Comm., July 28, 1998) (copy available at 1998 WL 12762695).
109. T. Shawn Taylor, Employees Question Fairness of Arbitration, The Bradenton Herald (Oct. 28,
2002) (available in WL, BRADHERALD database).
110. Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizens Congress Watch, Prepared Statement on the 2000
Fairness and Voluntary Arbitration Act (H. Subcomm. on Com. & Admin. L., June 8, 2000) (copy
available at
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gained a substantial benefit through small injuries to a large number of per-
sons."
112
The choice of arbitrators also places an aggrieved employee at a disadvan-
tage, even before the arbitration proceedings begin. Because arbitration organiza-
tions compete for contracts with employers, the repeat players in arbitration, the
arbitration organizations, have an incentive to favor employers in its decisions.' 1
3
Employees are unable to review the arbitrator's history of deciding disputes be-
cause there is no requirement of a public record in arbitration. 14 The securities
industry, however, is in a much different position, as it maintains an extensive
database of each arbitrator's prior awards."
Once arbitration begins, the employee is further disadvantaged by the lack of
formal discovery procedures, as discovery is left to the discretion of the arbitra-
tor.116 While the burden of proof is on the employee, the employer is often in
control of the majority of the relevant evidence in the case." Such evidence
could demonstrate pretext on the part of the employer or discriminatory con-
duct." 8 This discovery problem is compounded because "the ethical prohibition
against lawyers' 'ex parte' contacts with opposing parties (i.e., informal, and
without opposing counsel present) extends to many current, and possibly some
former, employees of a corporate defendant."
' 19
Employees are not only disadvantaged by inadequate discovery due to infor-
mality, but also face the possibility of excessive discovery of matters that would
otherwise be excluded if the claim was brought in a judicial forum. One commen-
tator has explained the discovery problem as follows:
In sexual harassment cases ... consensual sexual activity by the plaintiff
with persons other than the harasser is excluded under federal law and in
many state jurisdictions as irrelevant and invasive of the plaintiff's right
to privacy. Yet an arbitrator in such a case, under no obligation to com-
ply with such an evidentiary restriction, may allow the employer to for-
age where it desires in a plaintiff's private conduct.'
20
In resolving the dispute, the arbitrator is not obligated to follow the law or es-
tablished precedent. The Supreme Court recognized that arbitration may lead to
112. Id.
113. Id.; Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 395, 420 (1999); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Busi-
ness: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L. Rev.
33, 73-81, 122-123 (1997); Jean Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 647-52 (1996).
114. Claybrook, supra n. 110.
115. Palefsky, supra n. 108.
116. Schwartz, supra n. 113, at 46-47. "Arbitration generally eliminates pretrial motion and discov-
ery practice, and the informality of arbitration means less time preparing for hearing and presenting
evidence." Id. at 60.
117. Palefsky, supra n. 108.
118. Id.
119. Schwartz, supra n. 113, at 61.
120. Palefsky, supra n. 108.
121. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) [hereinafter "FAA Standard of Review"]:
12
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a result that is "radically different" from that which would occur in a judicial pro-
ceeding. 122 In order to overturn an arbitrator's decision, the standard of review
requires that the arbitrator (1) knew the law, (2) determined the law to be applica-
ble under the circumstances of the dispute, and (3) specifically chose to ignore the
law.123 Additionally, an arbitration award that is contrary to "some explicit public
policy" that is "well defined and dominant" may be overturned. 124 Courts may
also vacate "irrational" awards.' 25 However, the manifest disregard of the law
standard is especially difficult considering arbitration does not require a written
opinion or statement of law upon which the arbitrator relies.' 26 Despite its poten-
tial for abuse, courts have reasoned that limited review of arbitration decisions is
consistent with the "strong federal policy encouraging arbitration as a 'prompt,
economical and adequate' method of dispute resolution for those who agree to
it.,,127
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award
was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitra-
tion--
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon suf-
ficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made ....
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be
made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
(c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was made that was issued
pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award upon the application of a
person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the award,
if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in section
572 of title 5.
See Moohr, supra n. 113, at 403; Mark A. Sponseller, Student Author, Redefining Arbitral Immunity:
A Proposed Qualified Immunity Statute for Arbitrators, 44 Hastings L.J. 421,435-36 (1993) (recogniz-
ing that arbitrators are not required to follow "precedent, rules of evidence," or "rules of law," keep a
record of the proceedings, or answer to political constraints).
122. Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956):
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in the ulti-
mate result. Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury ... Arbitrators do not have the benefit of
judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of
their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is
more limited than judicial review of a trial.
123. Palefsky, supra n. 108.
124. Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 97 v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 143 F.3d 704, 715 (2d
Cir. 1998); see also United Paperworkers Intl. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1987); News-
day Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1990).
125. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Firequench, Inc., 1997 WL 570514 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Andros Com-
pania Maritima, 579 F.2d 691, 704 (1978).
126. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (stating
arbitrators are under no obligation to give reasons for award); McKesson Corp. v. Local 150 IBT, 969
F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1999); Claybrook, supra n. 110; Julian J. Moore, Student Author, Arbitral
Review (or Lack Thereof): Examining the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 1572, 1591 (2000) (arguing that because arbitrators typically conduct their affairs in
private fora, the public has no way to guarantee that public interests are being vindicated).
127. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1404, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1050, (1993); R.M. Perez & Assocs. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1992).
2003]
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2. Improving the Arbitration Process to Effectuate the Purposes of Title
VII
Employers determine if arbitration is an appropriate and effective dispute
resolution mechanism. Thanks to Luce, those employers which have chosen to
adopt MAAs should be able to "sleep better at night."'' 2 The decision in Luce
secures the value of MAAs to employers, as the utility of MAAs would be greatly
reduced were Title VII claims to be barred from them.' z9 More employers will
utilize MAAs, as they no longer face the threat of a court rejecting its validity in
the context of Title VII disputes. 1
30
The Supreme Court has held that statutory rights and remedies should be
equally available in both judicial and arbitrational forums.)3  In order to protect
such rights, the FAA allows courts to invalidate MAAs under the principles of
contract law, including breach of contract, public policy, and unconscionability.
32
Courts must be vigilant to ensure MAAs merely change the forum for dispute
resolution, rather than the rights and remedies guaranteed under Title VII. 133 For
example, it would be unlawful for employers to set limits on the amount of dam-
ages recoverable below the limits set by Title VII.' 34 It would also be unlawful to
force employees to pay for greater than half of the arbitrator's fees.
35
Employers must ensure the rights and remedies of Title VII are provided for
in their MAAs in order "to preserve the principles of due process and fairness to
ensure, to the extent possible, a 'level playing field' for employees."' 36 Unfortu-
nately, employers have received mixed signals from the courts regarding what
safeguards are necessary to ensure that an MAA is valid. One district court vali-
dated an arbitration agreement that reduced the statute of limitations to one year,
granted the employer the sole right to modify or terminate the agreement on thirty
days notice, and limited back-pay and punitive damages.
37
128. Bar to Employers' Use of Arbitration Lifted by Ninth Circuit, 12 No. 15 Cal. Empl. L. Letter 3
(M. Lee Smith Publishers, LLC, Sep. 30, 2002) (available in WL, SMCAEMPLL database).
129. See Keith A. Becker & Dianne R. LaRocca, Divided Court Crosses Wires over Circuit City
Decision: Holding Casts Doubt on Ninth Circuit's Duffield Decision, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 403, 414
(2002) (noting that the removal of Title VII from arbitration agreements would remove a large per-
centage of complaints that serve as the basis for an employer's choice of arbitration).
130. Shea Lukacsko & Ivan R. Novich, Arbitration Makes More Sense than Suits, Star-Ledger 018
(August 2, 2002) (available at 2001 WL 26104769).
131. Sidney Charlotte Reynolds, Closing a Discrimination Loophole: Using Title Vil's Anti-
Retaliation Provision to Prevent Employers from Requiring Unlawful Arbitration Agreements as
Conditions of Continued Employment, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 957, 971 (2001) (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
26; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44).
132. Id. at 973 (citing 9 U.S.C. §2 (2000)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 977.
136. Judith E. Harris, The ABCs of ADR, Employment and Labor Relations Law for the Corporate
Counsel and the General Practitioner, SG060 ALI-ABA 185, 210 (Mar. 7-9, 2000). For a summary of
how employees can ensure they craft valid arbitration following Circuit City, see id. at 213-21.
137. Tupper v. Bally Total Fitness Holdiang Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 981 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
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Another court severed a provision in an otherwise valid MAA that limited
punitive damages under Title VII claims to five thousand dollars. 38 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that:
[i]f we were to hold entire arbitration agreements unenforceable every
time a particular term is held invalid, it would discourage parties from
forming contracts under the FAA and severely chill parties from structur-
ing their contracts in the most efficient manner for fear that minor terms
eventually could be used to undermine the validity of the entire contract.
Such an outcome would represent the antithesis of the "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements."'
' 39
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found an arbitra-
tion agreement imposing fee-sharing requirements and requiring employee to
waive substantive rights under Title VII to be unenforceable. 140 The court refused
to sever the offending provision, reasoning that doing so would "reward the em-
ployer for its actions and fail to deter similar conduct by others."' 14 1 With such
diversity in court opinions, it is difficult to formulate an all-encompassing list that
would ensure a pre-dispute MAA's enforceability.1
42
3. Pending Legislation
While the judicial system has determined that MAAs covering Title VII
claims are valid, such a determination could be reversed by legislation. But even
if such legislation is passed by both houses of Congress, it would, like all other
legislation, face the threat of a veto. Such was the fate of two pieces of legislation
passed by the California legislature concerning arbitration of consumer com-
plaints, which was vetoed in October by Governor Gray Davis of California.1
43
The first piece of legislation would have prevented companies from forcing work-
ers to sign MAAs covering discrimination claims.' 44 The other would give em-
ployees the right to reject an employer-designated arbitrator, and would have re-
138. Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 (8th Cir. 2001); For an insightful analysis
of the issues raised in Gannon, see Michael K. Darning, Student Author, To Sever or to Destroy?: The
Eighth Circuit Allows Invalid Provisions, 2002 J. Dis. Res. 425 (2002).
139. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 682.
140. Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services, Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (1 1th Cir. 2001), vacated,
294 F.3d 1275, 1276 (11 th Cir. 2002) (vacated upon joint motion to dismiss by the parties).
141. Id.
142. However, the Practising Law Institute recommends the following provisions to protect
enforceability of arbitration agreement: (1) signed written agreement, (2) provide for a neutral decision
maker, (3) specify claims subject to arbitration, (4) exclude non-arbitral claims (e.g. claims for
unemployment insurance or claims under the NLRB), (5) include explicit waiver of right to jury trial,
(6) do not limit available remedies, (7) do not impose arbitration costs on employees, (8) do not
shorten the applicable statute of limitations, (9) place reasonable limitations on discovery, and (10)
provide for a written decision. Carroll E. Neesemann, Maren E. Nelson, Miriam Wugmeister & Lisa
Klerman, Securities Arbitration 2002: Taking Control of the Process, The Law of Securities
Arbitration, 1327 PLl/Corp 821 (PLI Order No. B0-01A6 2002).
143. Reynolds Holding, Consumers get arbitration help / Breakthrough laws lift secrecy, root out
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quired additional disclosure of the financial dealings of arbitration firms.145 How-
ever, Governor Davis did sign into law legislation that requires arbitration firms to
publicly disclose results and details of commercial disputes, and prohibits firms
from charging consumers a winning opponent's fee.
146
While the legislation in California was limited to disputes between consum-
ers, sellers, and manufacturers, similar legislation could be passed regarding em-
ployment discrimination complaints. The Preservation of Civil Rights Protections
Act, introduced in the House of Representatives, would amend the FAA by pro-
hibiting pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses covering statutory claims.
However, parties would be permitted to voluntarily consent to arbitrate a statutory
claim after it has arisen. 147 Another bill introduced in the United States House of
Representatives would allow employees to enter into arbitration agreements only
after an employment dispute arises, thus banning MAAs.14 8 While similar legisla-
tion has been proposed in previous sessions of Congress, the increase in the pieces




Courts are divided as to whether an MAA precludes membership in a class
action, and whether class action claims can be arbitrated. The prevailing view is
that MAAs that prohibit class actions, both in court and in arbitration, are not per
se unconscionable. 50 However, two recent California decisions found MAAs
containing clauses barring class membership to be unconscionable.' 5  Absent
other substantive unconscionability, courts generally will not invalidate clauses
barring class membership. 52 Additionally, it is unclear whether courts will ulti-
mately require whether parties must expressly provide for consolidation in their




147. H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. (2001) (available in WL, CONG-BILLTXT). See H.R. 1489, 107th
Cong. (2001) ("The Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001); S. 163, 107th Cong. (2001).
148. Marcia Coyle, Anti-arbitration Bills Set Offa Classic Brawl, 47 Natil. L. J. A8 (Aug. 12, 2002).
149. Id.
150. See Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 2002 WL 21932 at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2002); Doctor's
Assns. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D. Conn. 1996); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
2d 1097, 1107-09 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Zawikowski v. Beneficial Natl. Bank, 1999 WL 35304 (N.D. 111.
Jan. 11, 1999); In Gray v. Conseco, Inc., 2000 WL 1480273 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000); In re RealNet-
works, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. 11. May 8, 2000); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A.,
103 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
151. See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (basing its finding that an AT&T
directive imposing a binding-arbitration program on its long-distance customers was unconscionable
partly on a provision barring membership in a class action); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr.
2d 862 (2002) (holding that a provision barring class membership was substantively unconscionable,
against various aspects of public policy, and thus invalid).
152. See Pick v. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., 2001 WL 1180278 at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2001) (stating
arbitration clauses are generally not unconscionable solely because they preclude class actions).
153. See Champ v. Siegal Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (unless parties expressly
provide for class actions in arbitration, court may only compel arbitration of plaintiffs individual
claims). But see Blue Cross v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 790 (1998) ("[W]hen
16
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VI. CONCLUSION
Because mandatory arbitration agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims are
held enforceable across the circuits, the public should expect to see more employ-
ers utilize MAAs. Consequently, it is imperative that courts, or perhaps Congress,
adequately lay out the provisions of MAAs that are required to ensure that proce-
dural due process is served and that the rights and remedies of Title VII are vindi-
cated.
STEVEN S. POINDEXTER
the arbitration agreement... is silent as to classwide arbitration and state law specifically authorizes it
in appropriate cases, an order compelling classwide arbitration neither contradicts the contractual terms
nor contravenes the policy behind the [Federal Arbitration Act]."), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999);
Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1107-08 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding arbitration clause
not substantively unconscionable due to silence on the arbitrability of class actions).
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